The prevalence of memory corruption bugs in the past decades resulted in numerous defenses, such as stack canaries, control flow integrity (CFI), and memory safe languages. These defenses can prevent entire classes of vulnerabilities, and help increase the security posture of a program. In this paper, we show that memory corruption defenses can be bypassed using speculative execution attacks. We study the cases of stack protectors, CFI, and bounds checks in Go, demonstrating under which conditions they can be bypassed by a form of speculative control flow hijack, relying on speculative or architectural overwrites of control flow data. Information is leaked by redirecting the speculative control flow of the victim to a gadget accessing secret data and acting as a side channel send. We also demonstrate, for the first time, that this can be achieved by stitching together multiple gadgets, in a speculative return-oriented programming attack. We discuss and implement software mitigations, showing moderate performance impact.
Introduction
Memory corruption vulnerabilities have plagued the computer security field for more than 30 years. Multiple ways of exploiting memory bugs have surfaced, requiring controls to be placed at different levels in the software stack: mechanisms such as stack canaries and control flow integrity have been designed and deployed as a mitigation in existing software, while new languages were designed with memory safety to close this class of bugs in new programs [26, 29] .
Meanwhile, a new class of attacks, transient execution attacks [6] , and more specifically speculative execution attacks [5, 14, 16, 17, 20, 22, 25] have been the subject of intense scrutiny. The ensuing vulnerabilities appear difficult to mitigate without considerable performance trade-offs, leading to the conclusion that speculative execution attacks will remain a problem for the foreseeable future, and therefore a possibly fruitful area of research [23] .
A natural question to ask is whether the advent of transient execution attacks has changed the security stance of modern computing systems against memory corruption attacks: does the security of memory safety mechanisms, such as stack smashing protection (SSP), control flow integrity (CFI), and those embedded in memory safe languages, hold in the postspectre threat model?
In this paper, we show that multiple memory safety mechanisms that would otherwise successfully prevent exploitation of vulnerabilities can be speculatively bypassed to perform arbitrary memory reads. Because these attacks require a combination of techniques, we show that they do not apply to all memory safety mechanisms and a careful, case-by-case analysis is necessary.
At a high level, these attacks work by overwriting, either architecturally or speculatively, a backwards or forward edge, followed by the use of speculative code reuse attacks to leak data. In all cases this overwrite achieves a speculative control flow hijack, i.e., a redirection of the speculative control flow to an attacker-chosen arbitrary address. One case of such an attack is the speculative buffer overflow discovered by Kiriansky and Waldspurger [14] , where a return address is speculatively overwritten.
We demonstrate that SSP, GCC's vtable verification (VTV), and Go's runtime memory safety checks are all vulnerable. In particular, we develop an end-to-end proof-of-concept attack in the case of SSP, where the mitigations against a stack-based buffer overflow in libpng can be speculatively bypassed to read arbitrary bytes from the victim program. This attack additionally leverages a last level cache (LLC) eviction attack to extend the speculative execution window, and a speculative return-oriented programming (ROP) attack to achieve a Flush+Reload side channel by reusing 5 gadgets from the victim program. Both components of the attack are not specific to SSP and generalise beyond our selected use case. Our results show that, while such end-to-end attacks are not trivial to mount, they still represent a viable attack vector. For this reason we evaluate countermeasures for each attack scenario, showing how mitigations can be both effective and viable from a performance standpoint. This paper makes the following contributions:
• Demonstration of PoC attacks against SSP-based buffer overflow mitigations, GCC VTable Verification (VTV) and against Go's array bounds checks.
• Demonstration of an LLC eviction attack without knowledge of physical addresses.
• Demonstration of the use of multiple ROP gadgets (and the necessary condition for such attacks) for exploiting speculative control flow hijacks.
• Proposals of improved mitigations, withstanding speculative execution attacks, together with a performance evaluation.
Speculative execution attacks on memory safety mechanisms
In this section we describe end-to-end speculative execution attacks on abstracted memory safety mechanisms. We begin with a high level overview of the various components necessary to perform such an end-to-end attack. We then proceed to analyse the class of speculative control flow hijacks which is at the heart of the attack; we refer to this general category of attacks as SPEculative ARchitectural control flow hijacks, or SPEAR, and detail them in Section 2.1. Furthermore, we analyse the eviction mechanism in Section 2.2, and the speculative ROP in Section 2.3. Figure 1 shows an overview of the steps required to perform an end-to-end attack. The attack has a preparation phase (steps 1 and 2), where eviction sets (to ensure the existence of a suitably long speculation window) are identified, memory used by the side channel is created and initialised, and ROP gadgets are primed in the instruction cache. The attacker then submits an input to the victim in step 3, crafted to trigger a violation of a memory safety property. We assume that traditional exploitation of the violation is prevented by a suitable memory safety mechanism. However, the attacker uses a speculative execution attack to bypass the mechanism by overwriting (architecturally or speculatively) control-flow data, and obtaining a speculative control flow hijack (step 5). As a result, the victim is tricked into executing a side-channel send of attacker-chosen memory in step 6: this is achieved with the ROP component, which reuses code snippets from the victim program, appropriately selected and primed in the initialisation phase. The attacker can then execute the corresponding side-channel receive in step 7. The success rate of the attack is increased by concurrently executing an eviction loop to lengthen the speculation window (step 4) by carefully finding eviction sets for selected data.
SPEAR attacks
A SPEAR-vulnerable code sequence is a code sequence that results in a speculative control flow hijack. A speculative control flow hijack allows an attacker to gain control of the target program's speculatively-executed code. This is a powerful primitive: an attacker can follow such an attack with a speculative ROP sequence to speculatively execute code sequences that access a secret and send it to the attacker via a side channel. Figure 2 shows a breakdown of the various instances in the SPEAR attack class in the context of different variants of speculative control flow hijacks. Classic speculative control flow hijack attacks can be performed through micro-architectural components such as the Branch Target Buffer (BTB) and Return Stack Buffer (RSB) [16, 17, 20] . At the same time, the speculative control flow can also be influenced by instruction sequences that only affect architectural components, such as registers or memory: we refer to these as SPEAR attacks. For instance, executing the call %rbx x86 instruction speculatively, when the value of %rbx is available at execution time will result in speculative execution continuing at the address in the %rbx register. Therefore, if the %rbx register can be controlled by the attacker, a speculative control flow hijack can occur. This control by the attacker can either be architectural or speculative, as we will see next.
Similarly, a push %rbx; ret instruction sequence with the register value available would also simply continue execution at the provided address, with no need to predict where speculative execution continues via the RSB. Hence, SPEARvulnerable code patterns can concern both forward edges (jmp and call) and backward edges (ret).
The SPEAR categorisation offers us a convenient way to reason on attacks triggered by a control flow data overwrite.
The classification covers all attack scenarios studied in this paper, namely, speculative bypass of memory safety mechanisms; the classification also covers other known attacks, such as the speculative overwrite of a backward edge [14] , and the speculative bypass of manually-inserted array bounds checks in C/C++ [8] .
Architectural overwrite
The case where an attacker controls the control-flowinfluencing register architecturally, i.e., via the Instruction Set Architecture (ISA), is closely related to traditional memory corruption attacks. These attacks can nowadays be mitigated by mechanisms such as stack smashing protection (SSP) and, in general, CFI implementations that check the validity of control flow metadata before control flow is transferred, thus detecting and preventing outcomes induced by attackercontrolled overwrites. SPEAR architectural overwrite attacks focus on the opportunity that the attacker has to speculatively bypass the checks introduced by these mitigations. We provide in Listing 1 and Listing 2 two snippets of code that illustrate the forward and backward edge cases for architectural overwrites. The structure of both cases is similar: the original value of the edge (line 3) is preserved in a safe location, after which, we assume that the architectural overwrite is performed (line 8) with an attacker-controlled value (e.g. through a buffer overflow). Afterwards, the program executes an integrity check on the forward or backward edge (line 17) before performing the control flow transfer (e.g. SSP or CFI check). To increase the success rate of the attack we try to maximize the speculation window caused by the integrity check, for instance by causing the eviction of its reference value -in the snippet, this step is captured by a clflush instruction (line 11 Listing 2: Architectural forward edge overwrite
We follow the methodology of Mambretti et al. [21] and test the snippet using the Speculator tool [9] , which aids the detection of speculative control flow transfers by using performance monitor counters (PMC) and speculation markers. Results show that on every CPU tested, control flow is indeed speculatively transferred to the overwritten location, thereby bypassing the checks during speculative execution. As shown in Table 1 , speculative control flow hijacks are observed at least 95% of the time for Listing 1 and 97% of the time for Listing 2 on all tested architectures. We thus conclude that SPEAR attacks with architectural overwrites can result in speculative control flow hijacks. In Section 3.1 and Section 3.2, we further analyze SPEAR architectural overwrites of backwards edges (for stack canaries) and forward edges (for CFI).
Speculative overwrite
Alternatively, the attacker may control the control-flowinfluencing register speculatively. This means that in a first phase, speculative execution is triggered (for example by a conditional branch). In a second phase, the attacker speculatively influences the control flow edge, thus hijacking speculative control flow. The control-flow-influencing value may be the result of a load from an address that is generated during the speculative execution phase, or it may be loaded from a location that is speculatively overwritten by a preceding store operation, resulting in speculative store-to-load forwarding.
We provide in Listing 3 and Listing 4 the two snippets of code that illustrate the backward and forward edge cases for speculative overwrites. Both cases share the same structure. First speculative execution is triggered by a condition (line 2). Then, the speculative overwrite is performed through some instruction within the speculated part of the code. Here, the value used for the overwrite is under the control of the attacker (line 7). Finally, the overwritten value is used for control flow transfer allowing the attacker to hijack the speculative control flow (line 10).
Similarly to the architectural overwrite case, experiment results in Table 1 show that for the backward edge case the success rate is at least 92% while it is at least 98% for the forward edge case: speculative overwrites are feasible and lead to speculative control flow hijack provided that a sufficiently large speculation window exist during which the edge is overwritten, and later dereferenced. 
Speculative window and eviction
We now focus on an important requirement for SPEAR attacks: the existence of a speculation window to permit the execution of the control flow transfer and the side channel send operation, a common requirement for all speculative execution attacks. This requires a speculative execution trigger, i.e., an instruction that causes a wide-enough window of dependent instructions that are executed but not retired, awaiting the retirement of the initial instruction. This is usually achieved when the process accesses uncached data: the speculative window then corresponds to the time for the access to main memory to complete. In Listing 2 for example, this is achieved by the clflush instruction. To verify this, we re-run the snippet without clflush in the Speculator tool and verify that indeed the control flow hijack only takes place in about one run out of 1000. When it does, the window is only a couple of instructions wide. We therefore conclude that without eviction, or other similar approaches to lengthen the speculative window, SPEAR attacks are unlikely to be practical. In all snippets referenced by this section, the speculation window is artificially lengthened by flushing one of the memory operands to the compare instruction. This may not be realistic, as it imposes a strong requirement on the victim code to include a flush (or comparable) instruction. Instead, because the last level cache (LLC) is shared and often inclusive, the same effect can be accomplished more realistically by an external attacker thread computing an eviction set and performing a small number of accesses to addresses in this set. An LLC eviction set competes for the same LLC slice and cache set as the target address to be evicted. Existing techniques for performing such attacks typically assume knowledge of the targeted physical address, as the LLC is physically indexed. As a consequence of rowhammer attacks, this is no longer realistic, as most OSes have removed access to physical mappings for unprivileged users.
We demonstrate here that such eviction attacks can still be performed without knowledge of the physical address. To this end, we perform the eviction in two steps. The first step consists of the identification of an eviction set for a cache line in a page under the attacker's control, by following the approach of Liu et al [19] . The second step consists in releasing this page to the OS, and executing the victim process such that it reuses the previously-created page. This permits the reuse of the eviction set constructed and verified to be working in the first step. We show details of such a practical attack in Section 3.1.2 for SSP.
Speculative ROP
To perform a complete speculative execution attack, the speculative control flow hijack must be followed by a side channel send gadget with a secret input. Unfortunately, Spectre v1type Flush+Reload side channel send gadgets are known to be difficult to find [16, 31] . As in classical control flow hijacks [24] however, a speculative code reuse attack can be performed by concatenating the execution of speculative gadgets to construct a Flush+Reload side channel send sequence. To chain the gadget sequences, we observe that we can conveniently make use of a speculative overwrite of backward edges SPEAR variant, making such attacks very similar to existing code reuse attacks. A similar approach and analogy exists with forward edges for code reuse.
The requirements for performing speculative code reuse are the following: i) limited number of gadgets can fit into the speculation window; ii) all code pages where gadgets are used must be present and mapped in the victim process. The first requirement is a consequence of the behavior of speculative execution. Using Speculator, we concluded that the maximum number of empty gadgets that fit in the largest speculation window is 20. The second requirement is explained by page misses causing speculative execution to stop. We show in Section 3.1.3 that this can be achieved for a practical use case.
Case studies
In this section we analyze different case studies where memory safety mechanisms can be bypassed with SPEAR attacks. In particular, in Section 3.1 we use a proof-of-concept attack that speculatively bypasses SSP leveraging architectural overwrites of backward edges. Section 3.2 analyses architectural overwrites of forward edges, targeting two prominent CFI frameworks, GCC VTV and LLVM CFI. In the case of the former, we show how the integrity check of the forward edge can be used to performed a speculative control flow hijack. For the latter we report the constraints that this type of implementation presents and detail the conditions under which the checks may be bypassed. Finally, in Section 3.3 we demonstrate two types of speculative bounds check bypasses in the Go language using speculative overwrites of a forward edge. We show how the attacker may influence the control flow target through both a load whose address value is attacker controlled and a load of a value that was speculatively overwritten by the attacker.
Threat model. The general threat model for all attacks in this paper is a local unprivileged attacker, targeting privileged processes. The threat model for attacks based on architectural overwrite of a backward or forward edge assumes a local attacker able to provoke a memory safety violation, but unable to exploit it traditionally due to hardening mechanisms being in place. In addition, we assume that the victim program can either be executed multiple times by the attacker or that the program automatically restarts, given that each attack run leaks one byte at a time and likely leads to program termination afterwards. Although mitigations against repeated execution exist, they are not commonly employed and therefore this threat model remains realistic. For the speculative overwrite of a forward edge, demonstrated in the Go use case, the threat model assumes a victim program with a specific code sequence, and a local attacker able to provide input that exercises this code sequence. We do not assume that the attacker is able to inject code in the victim program. In all cases, we assume the attacker has access to the victim program code and is able to bypass ASLR, or that ASLR is not present, as in the case of Go. The goal of the attacker is, as in all transient execution attacks, to leak secrets from the target program.
Attacking Stack Canaries
Stack canaries are one of the earliest mitigations against buffer overflows [26] , and are widely used to this day. Among the most broadly adopted implementations are LLVM's and GCC's Stack Smashing Protection (SSP) and Microsoft's /GS. At a high level, stack canaries work by inserting a value (the canary) between stack buffers and control-flow influencing data on the stack, in particular the saved return value. The integrity of the canary is then checked prior to using the saved return value. Local stack variables are reordered such that buffers, likely to be overflowed, reside adjacent to the canary while code pointers remain further away. This way, contiguous overflows of local stack buffers can be detected by the integrity check. The chosen canary value is randomly generated once during process execution start, and stored in a safe location.
Each compiler performs the instrumentation differently but in essence the mechanics are identical with respect to SPEAR attacks; we therefore focus on the example of LLVM on Linux x86_64. Implementations consist of two distinct instrumentation atoms. The instrumentation atoms on our target system are shown in Listing 5. The first, the prologue SSP atom, is placed after the function prologue and local variable allocation, and is responsible for storing the canary value on the current stack frame. The second, the epilogue SSP atom, is placed before local variable deallocation and the function epilogue. It compares for equality between the global and local canary values; if the values differ, the __stack_chk_fail function is called, terminating the program. If the local canary value was not modified during function execution, the function returns normally. We show next that this particular comparison can be the target of a SPEAR attack. The pattern of the SSP instrumentation closely resembles that of Listing 1. Under our threat model, an attacker with a buffer overflow against a function protected by SSP can perform a SPEAR architectural overwrite attack of the return value of that function. We describe an end-to-end proof of concept of an attack targeting a version of libpng with a reported buffer overflow (CVE-2004-0597): the bug is not exploitable in the traditional way owing to the fact that the function is compiled with SSP. We show how a speculative adversary can exploit the SPEAR architectural overwrite to leak arbitrary secrets from the victim. The attack proceeds as follows: in the first step, the attacker overwrites the saved return address of a victim function, e.g., through a classical buffer overflow. In the second step, the attacker leverages a misprediction in the conditional jump of the canary integrity check, thus transiently executing a return to the previously overwritten return address. This PHT-based misprediction can be forced by the attacker in a way similar to Spectre v1, by executing the canary integrity check with an intact local canary sufficiently many times. As discussed in Section 2.2, another requirement is that a sufficiently long speculation window exist. We achieve this by evicting the global canary from the LLC, as we show in Section 3.1.2. The attacker is then able to perform a side-channel send operation by constructing a speculative ROP chain to access a secret and perform a side channel send, as we show in Section 3.1.3.
LLC eviction of the global canary
We apply the two-step method described in Section 2.2 for the eviction of the global canary from LLC, and thus from all cache levels by the property of inclusiveness of caches on the target platform. The global canary value is always stored at a fixed offset in a page: we use this property to find eviction sets for this particular offset, following the approach of Liu et al. [19] , which works without knowledge of physical addresses.
The attacker process first identifies a page with a known eviction set and then unmaps it to be reused by the victim to store its canary. This is achieved with two processes under attacker control, as follows. At first, one of them maps a hugepage and enters a loop in which it brings an eviction set into cache and waits for feedback from the second attacker process. The latter in turn probes its own stack canary and reports back a success as soon as the canary is no longer cached.
Once the eviction set is identified, the second attacker process releases the page hosting its canary by exec'ing the victim. During exec, the virtual memory of the process is released, thus pushing frames to the internal kernel freelist. Then exec creates mappings for the new process. Each subsequent memory access by the victim results in a page fault which is resolved by popping frames from the internal freelist.
The objective of the attacker at this point is to make sure that the page for which it holds the eviction set is allocated by the kernel for the victim to host its canary. The chances of this happening can be maximised by knowing the memory layout of the attacker and the victim and the (deterministic) way in which the kernel releases and allocates pages during an exec. With this method, we obtain an overall success rate of 66.6% ± 0.96 for LLC canary eviction. We report the mean over 100 runs with 95% confidence level.
Speculative ROP
We now focus on building and using a speculative ROP chain that accesses a secret and leaks it through a side channel. We use the Flush+Reload cache side channel initially used by Kocher et al. [16] , although other side channels can be used similarly [5, 22, 25] .
In Section 2.3, we have identified two major constraints on the attack: i) a limited number of instructions can fit into the speculation window; and, ii) all code pages where gadgets are used must be present and mapped with corresponding TLB entries. In addition to these requirements, we note that gadget code, as well as any data accessed by gadgets, must be available in cache during speculative execution. Typically, this is not an issue in speculative execution attacks because the attacker can use the first speculative execution attack as a warm up phase which brings the required data in the cache, whereas this attack is single shot: the process terminates after each attempt and this is an additional requirement.
Concerning the first requirement, the Flush+Reload sidechannel send gadget only requires a few instructions: there are sufficiently short gadgets available, and length is therefore not an issue in practice. For the second requirement instead, we create a tool to search for gadgets in code that was recently accessed by the victim program, for which pages are present and mapped in the victim process. The tool traces the victim process and collects all executed shared (library) code pages, which are then fed into an existing ROP gadget search tool, ROPgadget [1] . We ran the tool on the victim program and found 26 mapped code pages within the 4 different modules used by the victim: libc, libpng, libz and ld. In total, the tool discovered 2096 gadgets. Finally, to ensure that all gadget sequences are in cache, a hyperthread-colocated attacker performs a ROP chain warm up phase by executing the chain in close temporal proximity with the SPEAR attack. We build a 5-gadget ROP chain using the ROP gadgets found by our gadget search tool. The chain is functionally equivalent to the Flush+Reload gadget shown in Listing 6. The chain accesses a target address computed using a secret byte value, as in the initial Spectre attacks [16] . Because Flush+Reload requires shared memory, we choose the target address to reside in such a shared memory area between attacker and victim, the first 16 readable and executable pages of the libpthread library. To leak one byte we use an array size of 256. To avoid prefetching effects during side-channel receive, we choose the element size to be 256, i.e., four cache lines. The total array size equals 256 x 256 bytes, 16 pages.
The ROP chain that we find and use in the attack is shown in Listing 7. By splitting them in small sequences of instructions, we easily find the required gadgets within the constraints of the attack. This chain pops the addresses (controlled by the attacker) of the start of the 16 pages and of the targeted secret from the stack. Next the secret value is loaded at line 8. The next speculative gadgets multiply the secret value by 256 and compute the target address. The last speculative gadget dereferences the target address, resulting in a load being issued during speculative execution. This eventually brings the value into the cache to be measured by the attacker. The whole chain therefore allows the attacker to implement a universal read primitive over the victim process speculatively, using a Flush+Reload attack and the attacker's control over the stack. We measure the attack success rate as the number of times the attacker is able to correctly guess a secret byte from the victim memory space, per total number of runs. Canary eviction has a significant impact on the attack success rate. We therefore also show the attack success rate when successful eviction of the stack canary is detectable by the attacker, which could be achieved through a side channel, depending on the victim program. In both cases we measure how many victim secret bytes are leaked per second. We report means over 100 runs with 95% confidence level. We measure a success rate of 7.19% ± 0.62 for cases where the global stack canary is successfully evicted, and of 4.78% ± 0.41 assuming the attacker cannot detect a successful eviction of the global canary, the most generic case. This results in an end-to-end leakage rate of victim bytes of 0.3 and 0.2 bits per second respectively.
Attacking CFI
Control Flow Integrity (CFI) of forward edges aims to protect the integrity of code pointers used in indirect calls and jumps. CFI implementations contain two main parts: instrumenting all indirect control transfers to check their validity at runtime, and classifying valid control flow transfers (typically using static analysis at build time). We analyze here two prominent cases: the GCC Virtual Table Verification (VTV) [27] mechanism to prevent c++ virtual table corruption, as well as LLVM-CFI [18] , a publicly available, low overhead, forwardedge CFI implementation. In the GCC VTV, we prove that a SPEAR attack is possible, while in the LLVM-CFI case we conclude that eviction-related considerations result in the speculation window being too short for practical exploitation.
In particular, this case study demonstrates that we cannot conclude that SPEAR attacks apply equally to all implementations of memory safety-related defenses, and case-by-case analysis is necessary.
GCC VTV
In the GCC VTV implementation, for every call to a virtual function in the program, the compiler inserts a check to make sure that the pointer used for the indirect call belongs to the virtual table of the object. Such check is represented by a call to the function __VLTVerifyVtablePointer implemented in libvtv.so library. Within this function, the pointer is looked up from the table; if found, the function simply returns to the program which will perform the call, otherwise, it gracefully fails. If an attacker can successfully evict the cache line related to the variable the pointer is tested against, speculative execution is triggered during the evaluation of the check. In that case, the indirect call to the virtual function is speculatively executed and the code at the corrupted pointer is executed. At this point, the attacker has performed speculative control flow hijack and can mount a data exfiltration attack as described in Section 3.1.
In our proof-of-concept implementation of this attack, we artificially evict from all cache levels the variable related to the vtable of the object within the libvtv.so code. Then, we create a c++ program that defines two different classes each containing one virtual method. The first class is our target for the forward edge overwrite. To verify whether speculative control flow hijack takes place, we instrument the program to read performance monitor counters and set the speculative control flow hijack target to contain a speculation marker. We use the second class to instantiate the object that is later corrupted.
After object initialization, we perform a vtable pointer overwrite in our victim object making it point to the vtable of the first class. Finally, we perform the virtual call for the control flow transfer which is instrumented by GCC VTV with a call to the integrity check inside the libvtv.so library. During normal execution, this overwrite is detected by the library which reports the corruption and prevents the control flow transfer by terminating the application. With a SPEAR attack as described here, we verify that control flow hijacking occurs in 85% of runs, demonstrating that a SPEAR architectural forward-edge attack is viable against GCC VTV. We note also that the redirection is performed to a vtable of a completely unrelated class, a case which should be prevented by VTV. A real-world attack would additionally require evicting the compare variable, for example by using the same method as in Section 3.1.2, as well as a way of achieving a side-channel send for the attacker, as in Section 3.1.3.
LLVM CFI
The CFI solution implemented in LLVM uses function types as equivalence classes: an indirect call to a function of a different type than the one specified by the programmer is forbidden by the CFI instrumentation. This is achieved by placing functions of an equivalence class in a jump table, thereby having as many jump tables (whose addresses are carefully chosen) as equivalence classes. The instrumentation for indirect calls then consist in simply checking that the address of the target fall within the range of the jump table, and at the right alignment.
This range check can be seen as a check against a compileprovided constant value, using the address of the provided target. Both of these components are by design available and cached while performing this check: evicting the code that contains the range check would result in speculative execution stopping, and evicting the address of the target would result in the iBTB being used for speculative execution. In either case, a SPEAR attack would fail. The attack may be triggered without any attempt to artificially extend the speculation window, but, as demonstrated experimentally in Section 2.2, the resulting speculation window is rare and short, making such attacks unlikely to be practical. We conclude that LLVM CFI is in practice not vulnerable to SPEAR attacks.
Attacking memory safe languages
Most modern languages are designed to ensure memory safety. Instrumental to achieving this property are bounds checks for load and store operations into arrays. In this section we show how bounds checks may be speculatively bypassed, allowing the transient execution of out-of-bounds load and store operations. We show under which conditions this leads to a SPEAR attack.
We focus in this case study on the popular Go programming language, runtime and compiler. We present two variants, one where data that influences a forward control flow edge is architecturally overwritten and one where a forward edge is speculatively overwritten. In either case, the attacker is able to achieve a speculative control flow hijack. We prototype both variants and show the conditions under which the attack succeeds at a rate exceeding 80%. 
Listing 9: Arrays in Go
Before detailing the two attacks, we give a brief introduction to the way the Go compiler manages arrays and bounds checks. Arrays in Go are represented in memory as the struct shown in Listing 9. The address of the contiguous chunk of virtual memory backing the array is stored in array. The number of elements that array can hold (and implicitly the size of the memory chunk since Go is statically typed and the size of the elements is always known) is stored in cap. The current number of elements that have been stored in the array is stored in len.
Whenever an array access is performed in Go, the compiler will add appropriate bounds checks. This is achieved in the course of the compiler pass to translate the abstract syntax tree (AST) into the static single assignment (SSA) intermediate representation by adding an IsInBounds meta-operation before every array load or store. IsInBounds takes two arguments, the index of the current access and the length of the array, and drives a conditional jump either to the basic block that performs the array access if the index is between zero and length minus one, or a jump to a function that raises a panic otherwise. 
Listing 10: Bounds check in Go
IsInBounds is translated by later passes into a sequence of instructions similar to the one shown in Listing 10. The snippet shows a load from an array of integers: at first rcx is loaded with the address of the memory array, a compare instruction is issued between the index in rax and the array length at main.array+8. If the index is negative or not strictly less than the length, the code jumps to a call to the runtime.panicindex function. Otherwise the array access is performed.
The conditional jump generated by the IsInBounds metaoperation may speculatively execute the wrong jump target and perform a transient load or store operation out of bounds. We show two distinct code patterns, one leveraging a load and one a store, that may lead to speculative control flow hijack. 
Load-based SPEAR speculative attack
The first pattern is shown in Listing 11. It represents an instance of a SPEAR-speculative attack and consists of an interface function call, where the interface is stored into an array of interfaces array, dereferenced at position index. Note that the array must be an array of interfaces so that calling the function is achieved by an indirect call. For the attack to be successful, we need index to be attacker-controlled and the attacker must be able to store the value of two pointers in the memory space of the target process at a known location. The first condition is met whenever a process accesses an array using an index that is received as an external input. The second condition is very commonly met since programs store user-provided input for processing. Knowledge of the location of the stored pointers depends on the memory area being used, and is aided by the deterministic nature of the Go allocator. 
Listing 12: Structs used by interface calls
Without loss of generality, we describe the case where function is the first function defined by the interface. Exploitation proceeds as follows: first, the attacker prepares the memory structures that are used when an interface call is performed. The structures are shown in Listing 12, and are used by dereferencing the tab pointer from the iface struct and then calling into the fun array. In preparation for exploitation, the attacker ensures that the memory layout of the target program contains a pattern similar to that shown in Listing 13. Assuming that the attacker wants to speculatively redirect the control flow to address 0x563000, the attacker creates a fake itab structure (in the example at 0x562000) such that the first entry in the fun pointer array points to the desired target. Then the attacker creates a fake iface structure (in the example at 0x561000) such that the tab pointer points to the aforementioned itab structure. With the memory thus prepared, the attacker supplies the index into the array such that the resulting address (the base address plus index multiplied by the size of an iface structure) equals the fake iface structure (0x561000 in our example). With the index thus set the program will call the runtime.panicindex function; however if the conditional jump of the bounds check is mispredicted, the dereference and subsequent indirect call will take place transiently. Note that, contrary to the case studies in Section 3.1 and Section 3.2, the attack is not necessarily "single shot": if the program calls recover, the attacker might be able to execute the vulnerable sequence multiple times.
We prototype the attack to evaluate its effectiveness in a proof of concept. The proof of concept only aims to establish the feasibility of the attack: in particular we do not integrate into an end-to-end attack and refer to Section 3.1.4 for cache eviction and speculative ROP. The PoC contains the pattern of Listing 11 called in a loop to train the pattern history table and ensure that the bounds check conditional jump as strongly non-taken. The index used to access the array in the loop is in bounds during the training phase and is then set to the target index computed as described above in the last iteration.
To verify whether speculative control flow hijack takes place we instrument the program to read PMCs during the execution of the loop, and set the speculative control flow hijack target to contain a speculation marker. The runtime.panicindex function is modified to read and persist PMC values for each execution.
This instrumentation permits us to verify that speculative control flow hijack indeed takes place. The success rate is influenced by several factors that we review here. The most relevant factor is the size of the speculation window, which is influenced by how quickly the correct jump target is determined. The speculation window is maximised if the variables used in the compare instruction that drives the jump -especially the array length -are not present in any of the levels of the cache. In order to get empirical evidence of this fact we instrument the program with a clflush instruction right before the array dereference to ensure that the array length is not cached. In practice, an attacker may achieve the same result by performing cache eviction code sequences. However flushing the cache alone does not ensure a high success rate: this is because the array length is stored right after the base address of the array, whose address is loaded into memory as the first instruction of the dereference sequence. We verify that if the two memory locations belong to different cache lines, the speculation window is maximised. Another factor that influences the success rate is whether the target of the speculative control flow hijack is already in the instruction cache. We make sure that this be the case by inserting a call to the marker function in the warm up phase before the loop. We report success rates exceeding 80% when the array length is flushed and is in a separate cache line as the base address on multiple platforms (Xeon CPU E5-2640, Core i7-8650U, Core i7-6700K) and different versions of the Go runtime (1.13.4, 1.12, 1.10.4).
Store-based SPEAR speculative attack
The second pattern is shown in Listing 14. The pattern consists of a store operation of an attackercontrolled value at an attacker-controlled location into an array. The elements stored in the array must permit storage of a pointer. Smaller sizes would permit partial control over the speculative control flow hijack target. The pattern requires that the array store be followed by an interface call. The interface call does not need to be related to the array. It only needs to be in close proximity of the store operation so that it may still be speculatively executed. This pattern does not require any ability to perform preparatory store operations in the memory space of the target program. The pattern makes use of store-to-load forwarding, since the store in the array is used to (speculatively) overwrite a function pointer which is later (speculatively) loaded and called. This corresponds to the "speculative overwrite of forward edge" variant of a SPEAR attack.
The store part of the pattern consists of a speculative version of a "write-what-where" condition. It may be exploited in several ways to hijack the interface call: the most basic one would be to overwrite the tab pointer in the iface struct (see Listing 12) . However this would either require the attacker to perform a set of preparatory stores identical to those discussed in Section 3.3.1, or it would restrict the freedom of the attacker to choose a target out of the existing interface pointers. Another strategy would be for the attacker to overwrite the fun pointer in the itab structure directly. These structures are stored in a non-writable virtual memory region. However, given that the store takes place speculatively, the attacker is able to bypass the write restrictions and overwrite the pointer. We therefore chose to prototype this simpler and more effective variant.
Exploitation proceeds as follows: at first the attacker speculatively overwrites the fun pointer in the itab of the interface that is later dereferenced. This is achieved, as the attacker controls value and index. The former is set to the address of the desired speculative control flow hijack target; the latter is set such that base array and index multiplied by the size of the array elements add up to the address of the fun pointer to be overwritten. As in the previous section, with the index thus set the program will panic; however if the bounds check is mispredicted, the store-to-load forwarding and subsequent indirect call will take place, achieving speculative control flow hijack.
We prototype the attack to evaluate its effectiveness employing a similar instrumentation as the previous section, with PMCs and speculation markers employed to identify successful runs, and a loop to set the predictor state. The success rate is similarly influenced by ensuring that the variables driving the conditional branch are not cached, and that the speculative control flow hijack target is in cache. Under these conditions, we report success rates exceeding 80% on the same platforms listed in the previous section.
Mitigations
In this section, we implement and analyze serializingbased (lfence) and masking-based mitigations for SPEARarchitectural attacks (SSP) and SPEAR-speculative ones (Go). We show that in both cases that the masking-based solution results in a low overhead.
Mitigations for SSP
We investigate two possible mitigations for the SPEARarchitectural attack against SSP. A serializing instruction such as lfence can be inserted after loading the canary in the epilogue instrumentation, thereby ensuring that the comparison can only lead to a short enough speculation window. Alternatively, the return value can be masked architecturally with a generated value that is set to 0 when the check fails (the canary is corrupted), and all ones when it passes, as shown in Listing 15. We implement both mitigations as compiler passes in clang+llvm. SSP is architecture specific, thus our solution is built for x86_64 Linux systems. We run the SSP mitigations benchmarking on Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-6700K CPU @ 4.00GHz. We measure the normalized runtime of both return address masking and lfence on SPECint The lfence mitigation shows a high overhead in 9 out of 12 benchmarks, the highest being 100%, in the SSP All case with xalancbmk. Return address masking incurs a significantly lower, albeit still significant performance penalty, reaching a maximum of 13% for the same benchmark.
Based on this evaluation, we find the return address masking mitigation to be viable and superior to the lfence mitigation: the overhead of vanilla SSP (shown in Figure 3b on SPECint CPU 2006 is at most 9%, in the case of SSP All on xalancbmk). In addition, we note that most Linux distributions either use the SSP Loose or SSP Strong options, both of which incur a low overhead on all SSP benchmarks: we record a maximum of 2.1% overhead over the SSP Disabled baseline. With return address masking, the maximum overhead becomes 2.7% over the SSP Disabled baseline. We conclude that return address masking does not impose a significant overhead with the most commonly used SSP compiler options.
Mitigations for the Go compiler
We investigate possible mitigations for the SPEARspeculative attack on Go. The mitigations consist of two different compiler passes that ensure that the vulnerability is no longer exploitable. The first is based on lfence, whereas the second is based on branchless index masking sequences. As part of responsible disclosure we have notified the Go team, who have implemented index masking as an optional compiler switch. The feature is planned for Go 1.15.
The first mitigation consists of adding an lfence instruction after the cmp instruction in the sequence that implements the IsInBounds metaoperation. With reference to Listing 10, the lfence instruction is inserted after the cmp on line 2. The insertion ensures that all prior instructions have completed, which means that there will be no misprediction of the branch target and any out-of-bound access will result in a panic with no transient execution. The instruction is added explicitly in the pass that translates the AST into SSA form by defining a new Lfence meta-operation and adding it after each IsInBounds operation. We ensure that the operation is neither reordered nor eliminated.
The second mitigation we investigate entails the addition of an appropriate masking sequence that ensures that the index is set to a "safe" value in case of out-of-bounds accesses. The masking sequence amounts to a no-op in case the access is in bounds by performing an and operation on the index with a sign extended −1 mask. If the access is not in bounds, in our implementation, the masking operation forces an access of the element at index 0 in the array by performing an and operation on the index with a 0 mask. We can see the masking sequence in Listing 16: after the usual cmp and jmp instructions, length and index and subtracted in order to set the carry flag. Then, the sbb instruction is used to set a register to −1 in case of an in-bounds access or 0 otherwise. The array is subsequently accessed after performing an and operation on the index with the mask thus obtained. The pattern might be further optimised by using the cmp instruction of the bounds check to set the carry flag. This, however, is not always possible since the compiler will use a compare instruction with an immediate whenever possible. The immediate can only be the second source operand, forcing the direction of the comparison instruction. For the sake of simplicity we therefore rely on an extra subtraction operation. The masking instruction sequence is added by defining three new meta-operations -OpMaskStep1, OpMaskStep2 and OpMaskStep3 -which are later lowered into a sub, sbb and and instruction, respectively.
We measure the overhead of both mitigations by building the Go runtime version 1.12.0 and running the full benchmark suite. We run the experiments on a 40-core Xeon E5-2640 machine with 64 GiB of RAM. Figure 4 displays the empirical cumulative distribution function of the overhead of each of the two mitigation strategies. We can see how the lfence-based approach incurs a high overhead (143% mean and 84% median) due to the fact that lfence will terminate any speculative execution and thus severely curtail the instruction throughput. On the other hand, the masking approach shows a much lighter overhead (12% mean and 6% median) since the instructions involved are simple and do not cause any memory-related operation. Listing 16: Masking mitigation sequence; rdx contains the index and rcx contains the length of the array and rax contains the base address of the array 5 Related Work
Speculative execution attacks
Transient execution attacks can be subdivided into two main categories: fault-based and speculation-based attacks [6] . The speculation-based, or Spectre-family, attacks comprise those leveraging microarchitectural components such as the Pattern History Table ( PHT) for Spectre v1 [16] , the Branch Target Buffer for Spectre v2, the Return Stack Buffer (RSB) for Ret2Spec [20] and Spectre returns [17] . Both BTB and RSB attacks are cases of speculative control flow hijacks, i.e., they provide the ability for an attacker to steer speculative execution to an arbitrary location. Varied and powerful attacks leveraging the BTB for speculative control flow hijacks have been demonstrated, in combination with port contention-based, instruction cache-based, or BTB-based side channels [5, 22] . In contrast, this paper focuses on SPEAR attacks. Although the start of speculative execution always requires a speculative trigger, based on a microarchitectural component, the speculative control flow hijack step is based on architecturally visible control-flow influencing instructions in SPEAR attacks. Among the four subtypes of SPEAR attacks, in Spectre v1.1 [14] , Kiriansky and Waldspurger identify that speculative overwrites can lead to speculative control flow hijacks, whereas we identify three new types. We also demonstrate practical use cases on Go memory safety, GCC VTV and GCC SSP with a full working attack chain. The idea of chaining speculative gadgets in a way similar to ROP was suggested shortly after the first publication of Spectre attacks [10, 16] . While some publications have referred to the same idea [14, 22] , this paper presents the first demonstrated case of chaining multiple speculative gadgets to form a cache side-channel send gadget. In addition, this chaining is performed using a speculative overwrite of the return address, and not by poisoning the RSB or BTB.
Mitigations
Since the first speculative execution attacks have been disclosed in early 2018, different mitigations have been proposed to prevent each variant. Some mitigations are introduced at hardware level meanwhile others are software-based. Many of these mitigations target Spectre v2 type of attacks, meanwhile no complete mitigation has been introduced for Spectre v1.
The only available Spectre v1 mitigations are softwarebased and consists in either deploying barrier (e.g lfence) around each sensitive bounds check or, alternatively, masking the index used for accessing arrays [7, 14, 15, 30] .
While lfence is an effective mitigation, it incurs huge performance penalties if widely applied. Static analysis tools have been proposed to search for sensitive code patterns. One example is the Linux kernel where vulnerable code is instrumented on a case by case basis either through manual audit or automatic tools (e.g., smatch [3]) detection [4] . The drawback of current available tools is that they target Spectre v1 code patterns only and therefore are not useful to detect edges overwrites.
For Spectre v2 instead, there are software and hardware mitigations. The software mitigation currently available is Retpoline [28] . This mitigation targets indirect calls and indirect jumps and prevents them from being speculatively executed by trapping speculation within a loop. As in the barrier cases for Spectre v1, Retpoline requires code modification and therefore each program has to be recompiled to enforce such mechanism. While this has been done inside the Linux kernel, user-space programs have not yet been using this mechanism.
On the hardware side, Intel published three major protections: i) IBRS [12] , which prevents speculation of indirect branches using target values computed using lower privileged predictor modes, ii) STIBP [13] , which prevents BTB poisoning from sibling threads, and iii) IBPB [11] , which ensures that code before a barrier does not influence the behavior of the code after. IBRS and IBPB are meant to protect higher privileged code from lower privileged code [22] . The only mitigation that provides protection within the same privilege level is STIBP, which is not enabled by default for perfor-mance reasons.
Finally, Intel announced as part of its Control Flow Enforcement (CET) extension, the future introduction of a new mitigation that will constrain the target of near indirect jumps and calls to only ENDBRANCH instructions. With this mitigation there is a reduction of possible gadgets where speculative execution can be redirect to during branch target injection attacks. In the context of SPEAR, this mitigation applies only for the forward edge overwrite case and not to the backward edge.
Discussion
Applicability to other use cases. Beyond the highlighted use-cases, SPEAR attacks may be employed against other targets. For example, other memory-safe languages may be targeted with SPEAR attacks to speculatively bypass bounds checks as we showed for the Go programming language. Preliminary investigation suggests that this is likely to be possible, since instruction sequences for bounds checks similar to those detailed in Section 3.3 are also present in Rust and Java (for JITted blocks). Similarly, heap hardening mechanisms such as the checks inserted in recent versions of the libc allocator might also become the target of SPEAR attacks: they introduce conditional branches which verify properties of heap pointers (e.g. the value and size) and may terminate the program before the control flow returns to the application. A SPEAR attack might speculatively bypass that check, leading the application to possibly use corrupted pointers as part of a control flow decision. Theoretically, any security check that directly or indirectly gates a control flow transfer may be turned into a speculative control flow hijack attack. However, as demonstrated in the LLVM CFI case, a case-by-case analysis is necessary to establish whether SPEAR attacks are applicable.
General applicability of speculative ROP. The speculative ROP and LLC eviction techniques are demonstrated as part of the SSP, SPEAR-architectural overwrite of a backward edge, use case. Nevertheless these techniques are generally applicable for the exploitation of other SPEAR use cases, with exploitability always depending on the scenario at hand. For the general forward edge cases, we note that this requires, as in classical ROP attacks, a technique known as a stack pivot, which consists in the attacker setting up a fake return stack somewhere under its control in memory, and having the first control flow hijack point to an instruction setting the stack pointer to that address (for instance, the push rax; pop rsp; ret stack pivot gadget). We have verified using the Speculator tool that such stack pivots do work for SPEAR-architectural as well as SPEAR-speculative attacks.
Conclusion
In this paper, we investigate variants of speculative control flow hijacking attacks, called SPEAR, that exploit and bypass current mitigations against classic memory corruption vulnerabilities to leak information from local processes. With SPEAR, we show that Spectre-like vulnerabilities drastically increase attack vectors for local attackers. Therefore, they force not only the creation of new mitigations but also the re-design of previously deployed protections. In this work, we present attacks against stack canaries, CFI and memory-safe languages. We provide proof-of-concepts implementations against SSP buffer overflow mitigations, GCC VTV and Go's runtime. We show the use of multiple ROP gadgets and details on how to use LLC eviction without knowledge of physical addresses in the context of SPEAR attacks. Finally, we discuss how SPEAR attacks can be mitigated and report our performance results.
Disclosure
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